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COMMENT
In Defense of "Free Houses"
Eight years after the start of America's housing crisis, state courts are
increasingly confronting an unanticipated consequence: what happens when a
bank brings a foreclosure suit and loses? Well-established legal principles seem
to provide a clear answer: the homeowner keeps her house, and res judicata
bars any future suit to foreclose on the home. Yet state courts around the
country resist this outcome.
Banks have lost many foreclosure cases for two reasons, both resulting
from recent changes in the mortgage market. First, securitization has created
widespread errors in mortgage notes' chains of assignment, making it difficult
for banks to prove that they in fact own any particular mortgage. Second,
securitization contracts incentivize banks to use "foreclosure mill" law firms to
keep up with the flood of defaults, despite the fact that these firms are unable
and sometimes unwilling to detect and rectify basic legal errors.
When addressing faulty foreclosures, courts are afraid to bar future
attempts to foreclose -that is, afraid of giving borrowers "free houses." While
courts rarely explain the reasoning behind this aversion, it seems to arise from
a reflexive belief that such an outcome would be unjust.' Courts are therefore
1. See, e.g., Washington v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (In re Washington), No. 14-14573-
TBA, 2014 WL 5714586, at *1 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2014) ("'No one gets a free house.' This
Court and others have uttered that admonition since the early days of the mortgage crisis,
where homeowners have sought relief under a myriad of state and federal consumer
protection statutes and the Bankruptcy Code. Yet, with a proper measure of disquiet and
chagrin, the Court now must retreat from this position, as Gordon A. Washington ("the
Debtor") has presented a convincing argument for entitlement to such relief. So,
with figurative hand holding the nose, the Court, for the reasons set forth below,
will grant Debtor's motion for summary judgment."), rev'd, No. 2:14-cv-8o63
-SDW, 2015 WL 4757924 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2015); Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d
1004, 1007-08 (Fla. 2004) ("If res judicata prevented a mortgagee from acting on a
subsequent default even after an earlier claimed default could not be established, the
mortgagor would have no incentive to make future timely payments on the note. The
adjudication of the earlier default would essentially insulate her from future foreclosure
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quick to sidestep well-established principles of res judicata in favor of ad hoc
measures meant to protect banks against the specter of "free houses."
This Comment argues that this approach is misguided; courts should issue
final judgments in favor of homeowners in cases where banks fail to prove the
elements required for foreclosure. Furthermore, these judgments should have
res judicata effect-thus giving homeowners "free houses." This approach has
several benefits: it is consistent with longstanding res judicata principles
in other forms of civil litigation, it provides a necessary market-correcting
incentive to promote greater responsibility among foreclosure litigators, and it
alleviates the tremendous costs of successive foreclosure proceedings.
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I explains basic foreclosure and
mortgage-acceleration law. Part II describes how systemic banking behaviors
and market forces have resulted in banks increasingly losing foreclosure suits
after the 2008 financial crisis. Part III then describes how state courts have
struggled to develop their jurisprudence on "free houses," often ignoring these
significant market problems. Finally, Part IV contends that the application of
res judicata in foreclosure litigation is essential for two reasons: (i) it would
uniformly apply civil rules of finality to foreclosure cases, and (2) it would have
a much-needed positive behavioral effect on a mortgage-foreclosure market
run amok.
I. THE FORECLOSURE LAW BACKDROP
Foreclosures begin with a mortgage note's "acceleration clause." Under a
mortgage note, the homeowner is required to make a certain payment every
month for a fixed period.' In judicial-foreclosure states, if the homeowner
defaults on at least one payment for a specified amount of time,' the bank has a
choice: it can bring suit to recover just the missed payments,' or it can exercise
actions on the note -merely because she prevailed in the first action. Clearly, justice would
not be served if the mortgagee was barred from challenging the subsequent default payment
solely because he failed to prove the earlier alleged default.").
2. The standard home mortgage is thirty years. See Annamaria Andriotis, Picking the
Right Mortgage, WALL ST. J. (July 4, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/picking-the-right
-mortgage-1404487636 [http://perma.cc/T9B5-KCL4].
3. This time period may be specified in the note itself or it may be fixed by statute. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924C (West 2011) (requiring a minimum of ninety days between notice of
default and sale date and providing for a right to cure until five days before the sale date);
IOWA CODE § 6 54 .2D (2015) (providing for a thirty-day right to cure); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 6111 (2015) (providing for a thirty-five-day right to cure); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 244,
S 35 A(b) (2015) (providing for a right to cure of at least ninety days).
4. This is the lender's only remedy in contracts without acceleration clauses. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP. (MORTGS.) 5 8.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1997) ("[In t]he absence of an
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the acceleration clauses in the note and bring the entire remaining loan balance
due.' Under the mortgage contract, only acceleration allows the bank to
foreclose on the mortgage.7
In a foreclosure suit, the bank must generally prove the following: (1) the
homeowner has signed both the note (the underlying loan) and the mortgage
assigning the house as collateral for that note; (2) the bank owns the note and
mortgage; (3) the homeowner still owes a debt to the bank; (4) the
homeowner is behind on that debt; and (5) the bank has accelerated that
remaining debt in accordance with the terms of the note itself." When a bank
fails to prove these elements, a judge is legally required to rule in favor of the
homeowner.
Recently, courts have been inundated with suits where homeowners
question the bank's ability to prove the second element. Litigation over "proof-
of-ownership" issues in foreclosures is a growing nationwide problem;
sampling suggests a ten-fold increase between the periods immediately
preceding and following the 2007 collapse of the housing market.' Cases
acceleration provision . . . the mortgagee must either foreclose for each installment as it
comes due or wait until the amortization period expires to foreclose for the full accrued
obligation.").
5. Acceleration clauses are routine in mortgage notes. Id. ("Virtually all mortgages today
contain acceleration clauses.").
6. This option only exists where the acceleration clause is discretionary. In some rare cases, the
note is automatically accelerated once the borrower defaults. Id. ("While [the] 'option' type
[acceleration] provision is almost universally used, on rare occasion mortgage documents
may contain language that makes acceleration automatic on mortgagor default or on the
basis of a specific event . . . ").
7. Foreclosure can be either judicial or nonjudicial; judicial foreclosures require a successful
suit prior to sale, whereas lenders may only go to court in a nonjudicial foreclosure to
enforce an eviction after sale. See id. § 8.2 cmt. a.
8. See, e.g., GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Ford, 73 A.3 d 742, 751 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (setting out
what Connecticut law requires in a prima facie case for foreclosure); Chase Home Fin. LLC
v. Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 11, 985 A.2d 508, 510-11 (setting out what Maine law requires in
a prima facie case for foreclosure).
9. A search on March 5, 2015 of the Lexis State & Federal Cases database for "(foreclosure w/s
standing) AND (mortgage or 'deed of trust' or 'trust deed')" yielded 5,149 cases between
January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2014. The corresponding number between January i,
2000 and December 31, 2007 was 522. On Westlaw, the search produced 3,913 results for the
2007-2014 period, and 306 results for 2000-2007. For the results of an identical search
performed in November 2013, see Adam J. Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization,
Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title, 63 DuKE L.J. 637, 642 n.18 (2013). See, e.g.,
In re Foreclosure Cases, No. 07-CV-2532, 2007 WL 3232430, at *2-3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31,
2007); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf, 2014 ME 89, 96 A. 3d 700; U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.
Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 55 (Mass. 2011); Argent Mortg. Co. v. Maitland, 958 N.Y.S.2d 306
(Sup. Ct. 2010).
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addressing this kind of "failed foreclosure" have reached state supreme and
appellate courts, including- recently- the Maine Supreme Court.o In certain
states, including Florida," New Jersey," and New York," courts have also been
confronted with cases where, after accelerating the note and initiating a
foreclosure proceeding, the bank abandons the proceeding and the statute of
limitations on the accelerated debt expires, calling the third element into
question. 4
This massive increase in cases where banks' prima facie case is challenged
or outright fails is not the product of novel foreclosure law or changes in its
application. Rather, we argue, it is due to fundamental changes in how banks
handle mortgages-the same changes that facilitated the financial crisis of
2008- and banks' unwillingness to invest in sufficient legal services to adapt to
these underlying structural changes when pursuing foreclosures.
II. WHY HOMEOWNERS WIN THEIR FORECLOSURE CASES:
SECURITIZATION AND ITS MARKET FAILURES
To successfully bring a foreclosure suit a bank must produce very little
evidence. Why has this proven so difficult? The answer lies with banks' own
practices. In the last twenty years, banks have significantly altered how they
profit from mortgages; however, they failed to adequately adapt their record
keeping and customer-service practices.
In the 1990s, banks began to convert long-term mortgages, familiar to
most Americans, into short-term financial commodities, a process called
securitization. Rather than keep mortgages on the books, mortgagees (banks)
sought to sell the mortgages immediately to financial entities that would
io. See Bank ofAm., 96 A.3d at 7oo; see also, e.g., Lizio v. McCullom, 36 So. 3 d 927, 928 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
ii. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Bartram, 140 So. 3 d 1007, 1008-o9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review
granted, 16o So. 3 d 892 (Fla. 2014).
12. See, e.g., Washington v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (In re Washington), No. 14-14573-
TBA, 2014 WL 5714586, at *1 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. S, 2014), rev'd, No. 2:14-cv-8063
-SDW, 2015 WL 4757924 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2015).
13. Argent Mortg. Co., 958 N.Y.S.2d 306.
14. See, e.g., Bartram, 140 So. 3 d at oo8; In re Washington, 2014 WL 5714586, at *1; see
also Michael Corkery, Foreclosure to Home Free, as 5-Year Clock Expires, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2o5/o3/3o/business/foreclosure-to-home-free-as
-5 -year-clock-expires.html [http://perma.cc/LXD5-TMSJ] ("[fIn a growing number of
foreclosure cases filed when home prices collapsed during the financial crisis, lenders may
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transform thousands of individual mortgages into securities -financial
instruments that entitled the bearer to homeowners' mortgage payments and
that could be arbitrarily restructured or resold." After securitization, although a
homeowner would continue to make mortgage payments to the originating
bank, that bank ceased to have a financial interest in receiving these payments.
Instead, a variety of investors owned an interest in the pool of mortgage
payments of which the homeowner's is a part.' 6
Securitization gave rise to widespread errors in the documentation of
mortgage ownership. To allow a variety of investors to own portions of a
mortgage pool, originating banks entered into pooling and servicing
agreements, which authorized "servicers" -sometimes large commercial banks,
but often companies who were primarily or exclusively engaged in servicing-
to act as the diffuse investors' agents in receiving payments from and pursuing
foreclosures against homeowners. Because actual ownership of the mortgage
note became independent of servicing and the relationship with the mortgagor,
a loan, or the right to receive part of the payments on that loan, might be sold
several times while the homeowner still interacted with the same servicer.
Conversely, the servicer might change while the loan remained part of the same
investment pool. Throughout this reshuffling of tide ownership and servicing,
banks frequently made errors in how they documented and recorded their
ownership of mortgages."
Common mortgage fee structures set up in pooling and servicing
agreements also disincentivized servicers and their attorneys from devoting
adequate resources to foreclosures. Each servicing agreement paid servicers a
flat annual fee of around 0.25% of the loan's total value (for example, $500 per
year on a $200,000 loan), but the cost of pursuing a single foreclosure cost
servicers around $2,500.8 When foreclosures began climbing precipitously in
2007,'9 servicers were unprepared to handle the sudden increase in volume and
15. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C.
BANKING INST. 5, 32-33 (2009).
16. An excellent explanation of the process by which securitization took place, and of its role in
the initial financial crisis of 2007, can be found in the podcast This American Life: The Giant
Pool of Money, CmI. PUB. MEDIA (May 9, 2008), http://www.thisamericanlife.org
/radio-archives/episode/355/the-giant-pool-of-money [http://perma.cc/H37H-YHN4].
17. See, e.g., Molly Rose Goodman, The Buck Stops Here: Toxic Titles and Title Insurance, 42 REAL
EST. L.J. 5, 30-32 (2013).
is. Eric Dash & Nelson D. Schwartz, Bankers Ignored Signs of Trouble on Foreclosures, N.Y. TiES
(Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.coM/2010/lo/14/business/14mortgage.html [http://
perma.cc/B4K4-BFE3]-
ig. FED. Hous. FIN. AGENCY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FHFA's OVERSIGHT OF FANNIE MAE'S
DEFAULT-RELATED LEGAL SERVICES 11 (2011), http://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/AUD
-2011-004.pdf [http://perma.cc/776K-RWRE] ("Between 2007 and 2010, the volume of
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had no incentives to devote additional resources to prove their banks'
ownership over each mortgage.' To demonstrate ownership without
expending more resources than pooling and servicing agreements allotted,
bank employees signed hundreds of thousands of affidavits asserting that they
had seen and could attest to the contents of original documents demonstrating
ownership of the underlying mortgage. Although such affidavits were a legally
acceptable means of demonstrating such ownership, a significant number of
them were actually fraudulent.'
Similarly, servicers' attorneys also relied on sloppy paperwork-and,
at times, on fraudulent and unethical practices in foreclosure proceedings.
For example, one New Jersey foreclosure law firm operated without any
method of contacting its mortgage-servicer clients. Instead, the firm received
all work orders through a one-way computer system, along with a requested
timeline and documents the servicer had determined were necessary.' This
underresourcing and the resulting ethical transgressions have affected
hundreds of thousands of foreclosures."
Fannie Mae foreclosures increased to historic levels . . . . Fannie Mae foreclosed on 262,078
properties in 2010, an 8o% increase from 2oo9 and a 433% increase from 2007.").
2o. See Ariana Eunjung Cha & Brady Dennis, Under Piles of Paperwork, A Foreclosure System in
Chaos, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2olo/o9/22/AR2oloo922o6146.html [http://perma.cc/QB59-PWHF] (noting that
"as millions of Americans are being pushed out of the homes they can no longer afford, the
foreclosure process is producing far more paperwork than anyone can read and making it
vulnerable to fraud").
21. See Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Bradbury, 2011 ME 120, 55 2-7, 32A.3 d 1014, 1015-16.
22. In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009), affd, 65 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2011).
23. For example, in 2012, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman announced a
four-million-dollar settlement with the Steven J. Baum law firm and Pillar Processing, who
had filed more than a hundred thousand foreclosure cases between 2007 and 2010. See Press
Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att'y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces $4 Million
Settlement with New York Foreclosure Law Firm Steven J. Baum P.C. and Pillar
Processing LLC (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman
-announces-4-million-settlement-new-york-foreclosure-law-firm-steven-j [http://perma.cc
/Q8ZA-QYSA]. Similarly, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) issued a 2011 report
that faulted Fannie Mae for its reliance on "foreclosure mills" and failure to intervene in the
face of mounting evidence of attorney abuses, and described additional examples of firms
perpetrating abuses in their efforts to do large volumes of foreclosures on the cheap. See
FED. Hous. FIN. AGENCY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 19, at 14. The FHFA report
described cases where courts levied "significant financial sanctions against the abusive firms
and -in some cases- their clients, which included Fannie Mae." Id. These included a 2006
New Jersey bankruptcy where the judge issued a $125,000 sanction against a mill that had
"filed 250 motions seeking permission to seize homes using pre-signed certifications of
default executed by an employee who had not worked at the firm for more than a year." Id.
(citing Gretchen Morgenson & Jonathan D. Glater, Foreclosure Machine Thrives on Woes,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/o3
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The result of securitization contracts' underresourcing of mortgage
servicers and their attorneys has been a "factory-line approach to litigation,"
rife with abuses.' In many individual cases, these litigation strategies have
been unsuccessful. Homeowners, their attorneys, and sometimes judges have
successfully prevented foreclosure by demonstrating the falsity of an affidavit
or simply by forcing the mortgagee to produce actual documentation that it
owned the mortgage.' As an increasing number of foreclosure suits are lost on
the merits for lack of documentation, or for failure to prosecute within the
statute of limitations, courts face a new problem: what happens next?
III. THE COURTROOM SOLUTION: ANYTHING BUT "FREE HOUSES"
In many states, longstanding principles of res judicata, when taken with the
state law's treatment of acceleration clauses, require courts to grant
homeowners "free houses" when banks lose their foreclosure cases. But many
courts have declined to give these cases preclusive effect.
Whether servicers lose because they fail to prove ownership or because
their lawyers simply stop litigating, the first choice courts face is whether to
dismiss the case with prejudice. Typically, once parties have a full and fair
opportunity to present their cases, failure to prove one's case results in
/3o/business/3omills.html [http://perma.cc/7N4G-QJ67]). In 2010, a judge sanctioned an
Orlando law firm employed by Fannie Mae, imposing a fine of $33,500 for filing sixty-seven
faulty motions to remove borrowers from their homes. Id. A Texas bankruptcy judge found
problems in all eight of the foreclosure cases carried out by a mill it reviewed, including the
use of "inaccurate information about defaults [and] fail[ure] to attach proper
documentation when it moved to seize borrowers' homes." Id. The judge imposed seventy-
five thousand dollars in sanctions. Id.
24. Morgenson & Glater, supra note 23.
25. See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, No. 07CV2532, 2007 WL 3232430, at *2-3 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
31, 2007) (finding mortgagee documentation inadequate and asserting the federal court's
authority to rule in the case); U.S. Bank Nat'i Ass'n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 55 (Mass.
2011) (holding that ownership of the note without title was an insufficient basis to foreclose,
that this result was simply an application of the current law, and that "[a]ll that has changed
is the plaintiffs' apparent failure to abide by those principles and requirements in the rush to
sell mortgage-backed securities"). Judge Schack, a trial judge sitting in the New York
Supreme Court for Kings County, has repeatedly sanctioned law firms for bringing
improper foreclosure suits when he has independently discovered the inadequacy of the
plaintiffs' evidence as to defendants' indebtedness or plaintiffs' ownership of the note. See,
e.g., Argent Mortg. Co. v. Maitland, 958 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Sup. Ct. 2010); Wells Fargo Bank v.
Hunte, 91o N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 2010); NetBank v. Vaughn, 841 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct.
2007).
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dismissal with prejudice.2 In addition, dismissal with prejudice can be used as
a sanction. Judges in foreclosure cases have issued dismissals with prejudice
due to a lender's failure to appear at case-management conferences' or
mediationj lack of prosecution, 9 or a lender's failure to meet court-imposed
deadlines.30 If banks attempt a subsequent foreclosure, courts must then
determine whether that dismissal with prejudice bars only an attempt to collect
on the particular missed payments that led to the initial foreclosure suit, or
whether the dismissal bars a future attempt to collect on any default on the
debt.
While the latter holding may seem extreme, it is in accordance with settled
principles of lending law in many states. In these states, acceleration is
irrevocable -exercising the acceleration clause in the mortgage note turns an
obligation to make installment payments into an "indivisible" obligation."
Logically, after acceleration, there are no more monthly payments. A
foreclosure is an action to recover the entire loan balance, and a loss bars any
future attempt to collect on the note. In effect, the borrower gets to keep his
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1, at 6 (AM. LAw. INST. 1982) ("The principle
underlying the rule of claim preclusion is that a party who once has had a chance to litigate a
claim before an appropriate tribunal usually ought not to have another chance to do so.").
Res judicata attaches whenever the parties have had a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate,
including the "freedom to present substantive contentions and full and fair access to
evidence." Id. at 9. When these procedural predicates are satisfied, then "under that system
of procedure there must be compelling reasons to sustain a plea for a second chance." Id.
27. See, e.g., Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1ooS (Fla. 2004) (noting the lower
court's dismissal of a foreclosure with prejudice due to the mortgagee's failure to appear at a
case-management conference); Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Beauvais, No. 3D14-575, 2014
WL 7156961, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2014) (same).
28. See, e.g., Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Bartlett, 2014 ME 37, 5 4, 87 A.3 d 741, 745 (noting
the lower court's dismissal of a foreclosure with prejudice, in part because the plaintiff failed
to attend mediation sessions).
29. See, e.g., Washington v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (In re Washington), No. 14-14573-
TBA, 2014 WL 5714586, at *6 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2014) (noting an earlier dismissal by
the superior court for lack of prosecution), rev'd, No. 2:14-cv-8o63-SDW, 2015 WL 4757924
(D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2015).
30. See, e.g., Johnson v. Samson Constr. Corp., 1997 ME 220, ¶ 4, 704 A.2d 866, 868 (noting
the lower court's dismissal of a foreclosure with prejudice because the plaintiff's attorney
failed to file the report of conference of counsel within ten days).
31. See id. ¶ 8, 704 A.2d at 869; U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gullotta, 120 Ohio St. 3 d 399, 20o8-
Ohio-6268, 899 N.E.2d 987, at ¶ 30; Snyder v. Exum, 315 S.E.2d 216, 218 (Va. 1984)
(finding that acceleration of a mortgage was irrevocable); see also Tiedeman Mortg. & Fin.
Co. v. Carlson, 152 S.E. 909, 909-10 (Ga. Ct. App. 1930) (applying this rule to an
acceleration clause implied in an installment contract); Hamlin v. Peckler, No. 2005-SC-
oooi66-MR, 2005 WL 3500784, at *2 (Ky. Dec. 22, 2005) (noting in dicta that acceleration
would preclude a separate subsequent foreclosure action).
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house without being subject to a continuing obligation on the mortgage -a
"free house."' Courts in irrevocable acceleration states that considered the
issue before the 2008 financial crisis applied res judicata to subsequent
foreclosures in this way.'
Recently, however, judges have avoided applying res judicata to foreclosure
cases and have bent the rules to favor banks. For example, in Maine, where
longstanding precedent established that a failed foreclosure bars any future
attempt to collect on the debt," two trial courts recently refused to dismiss
cases with prejudice, even after the cases were tried to completion and the
banks had lost. The judges in those cases were explicit that they did so to allow
any subsequent actions the banks might want to bring and to avoid giving the
homeowners a windfall."s
On appeals from those cases, the Maine Supreme Court went even further
than the trial courts in changing the law to favor foreclosing banks. The court
held that the bank's ownership of the mortgage, which has long been
recognized as an element of the bank's prima facie case for foreclosure,6 is
actually an element of standing.17 Thus, whenever a bank fails to prove
32. Although we refer colloquially to these houses as "free," the homeowner may have paid the
equivalent of a significant portion of the mortgage - or even close to the entirety- prior to
falling behind on payments and incurring the foreclosure action, depending on when in the
life of the mortgage the foreclosure claim is brought.
33. See, e.g., Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, Inc., 150 So. 2d 468, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963) ("[A]n election to accelerate puts all future installment payments in issue and
forecloses successive suits."); Johnson, 1997 ME 220, ¶ 8, 704 A.2d at 869 ("Once Johnson
triggered the acceleration clause of the note and the entire debt became due, the contract
became indivisible. The obligations to pay each installment merged into one obligation to
pay the entire balance on the note.").
34. See Johnson, 1997 ME 220, 9 8, 704 A.2d at 869.
S See Order After Remand for Dismissal With Conditions, Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf,
No. BRIDC-RE-11-lo9 (Me. Super. Ct. 2014) ("[T]he court is hard pressed to award the
defendant the extraordinary benefit of a judgment or dismissal with prejudice that would
preclude future enforcement of the mortgage security interest."); Homeward Residential,
Inc. v.. Gregor, No. REi1o8, 2014 VVL 7802864, at *3 (Me. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 2014)
("[T]he court is entering judgment for Defendant, but the court is reserving the right for
both parties to relitigate the issues discussed herein so that this action does not act as a bar
to a future action."), vacated, 2015 ME 1o8, 122 A. 3d 947.
36. Chase Home Fin. LLC v. Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 11, 985 A.2d 508, 510-11.
37. While this conclusion may appear reasonable on its face, consideration of other cases where
elements of the plaintiffs prima facie case overlap with elements of standing reveals the
court's error. For example, injury in fact is an element of standing while proof of damages is
an element of many different causes of action. These two concepts are often closely related.
See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
275, 307 (2008) ("Injury in fact asks whether the plaintiff suffered a factual injury, such as
pain, the loss of money, or some other harm."). However, when a suit is tried to completion
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ownership of the mortgage, even if that occurs after a full trial on the merits,
the complaint must be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. 8 In other words, the court's ruling granted banks potentially
infinite bites at the apple in foreclosure proceedings."
In Florida, where intermediate courts had similarly barred subsequent
foreclosures on res judicata grounds, 4o the state supreme court in 2004
determined that irrevocable accelerations did not bar subsequent foreclosures.
Instead, in Singleton v. Greymar Associates, the court held that the second action
could go forward because it was based on a "subsequent default."4 ' In other
words, despite the acceleration of the mortgage, the court presumed a
continuing obligation by the homeowner to make monthly payments.4
In Singleton, the Florida Supreme Court declared without analysis that
barring subsequent foreclosures would produce inequitable results. In the
next Part, we argue that state courts like the Singleton court are wrong on this
and the fact finder determines that the plaintiff has failed to prove any injury, courts do not
generally dismiss without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Rather, they
might award nominal damages. See Coastal Power Int'l, Ltd. v. Transcon. Capital Corp., io
F. Supp. 2d 345, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) affd, 182 F.3 d 163 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Although any
breach of contract entitles the injured party at least to nominal damages, he cannot recover
more without establishing a basis for an inference of fact that he has been actually
damaged." (quoting ii SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 1345,
at 231 (3d ed. 1968))). Similarly, when a plaintiff fails to prove causation, which is also an
element of standing, courts rule against the plaintiff rather than dismissing the case. See,
e.g., Russo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 140 F. 3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 1998) (affirming entry of
judgment as a matter of law for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff failed to
prove causation).
38. Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Gregor, 2015 ME io8, ¶¶ 25-26, 122 A-3d 947, 955; Bank of
Am. v. Greenleaf, 2015 ME 127, ¶5 7-8, 124 A.3d 1122, 1124-25.
39. See infra Part IV.
40. See Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, Inc., 15o So. 2d 468, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)
("[A]n election to accelerate puts all future installment payments in issue and forecloses
successive suits.").
41. 882 So. 2d 1004, ioo8 (Fla. 2004). Some other courts have embraced the Singleton rule. See
Fairbank's Capital Corp. v. Milligan, 234 F. App'x 21, 24 (3d Cir. 2007); Afolabi v. Atl.
Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 849 N.E.2d 1170, 1174-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 20o6). While no cases directly
disavow Singleton, other states continue to apply res judicata to subsequent foreclosures. See
U.S. Bank Nat'Il Ass'n v. Gullotta, 120 Ohio St. 3 d 399, 20o8-Ohio-6268, 899 N.E.2d 987, at
5 29; Hamlin v. Peckler, No. 2005-SC-oooi66-MR, 2005 WL 3500784, at *1-2 (Ky. Dec. 22,
2005) (affirming the application of res judicata to subsequent foreclosures in theory while
declining to reach the merits of the case because the trial court vacated its initial dismissal).
42. The Singleton court did not engage with the reasoning in Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers,
Inc. that acceleration places the entire balance at issue. Singleton, 882 So.2d 1004.
43. Id. at 1oo8 ("Clearly, justice would not be served if the mortgagee was barred from
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score. By focusing on the immediate consequence of a ruling for homeowners,
the courts ignore perverse incentives created by allowing banks to continue to
externalize the costs of their mistakes.
IV. THE CASE FOR "FREE HOUSES" AS MARKET CORRECTION
So what should courts do when banks lose their foreclosure cases? As
described above, one approach-that taken by the Florida and Maine Supreme
Courts - is to bend the rules of res judicata to avoid a windfall for homeowners.
This approach creates few benefits and significant economic problems. In this
Part, we argue that further subsidizing banks' poor litigation practices results
in deadweight loss by contributing to negative public-health outcomes and by
disincentivizing banks from improving their servicing and litigation
techniques. We also explain how granting winning homeowners "free houses"
will not negatively affect the mortgage market.
First, giving systematic permission to mortgagees and their attorneys to
engage in repeated attempts to foreclose upon properties results in a broader
social subsidization of irresponsible behavior. And these subsidies are large. As
economists recognize, prolonged foreclosure proceedings create negative social
externalities, depressing surrounding homes' resale value, reducing local
governments' tax revenues, and increasing criminal activity.' Foreclosures also
appear to have significant effects on community members' physical and mental
health, and correlate with increased rates of depression, anxiety, suicide,
cardiovascular disease, and emergency-care treatment.' In fact, scholars who
44. See, e.g., GEOFFRY WALSH, NAT'L CONSUMER LAw CTR., STATE AND LocAL FORECLOSURE
MEDIATION PROGRAMS: CAN THEY SAvE HOMEs? 3 (2009) (reporting that on every
completed foreclosure in November of 2008, investors lost an average of fifty-seven percent
of their initial investment); Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of
Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE 57, 58 (2006) (finding that "for the entire city of Chicago, the 3,750
foreclosures that occurred in 1997 and 1998 are estimated to have reduced nearby property
values by more than $598 million, or an average of $159,000 per foreclosure"); Dan
Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on
Neighborhood Crime, 21 HOUSING STUD. 851, 863 (2006) (suggesting that "[h]igher
neighborhood foreclosure rates lead to higher levels of violent crime at appreciable levels");
see also Zhenguo Lin et al., Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property Values, 38
J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 387 (2009) (finding significant spillover effects from foreclosed
property within a ten-block radius that persisted for five years); Jenny Schuetz et al.,
Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated Mortgage Foreclosures, 17 J. HOUSING EcoN. 3o6 (2008)
(finding that home prices decreased with proximity to foreclosures on the basis of a 2000-
2005 New York dataset).
45. See Mariana Arcaya et al., Effects ofProximate Foreclosed Properties on Individuals' Systolic Blood
Pressure in Massachusetts, 1987 to 2008, 129 CIRCULATION 2262, 2267 (2014) ("[O]ur findings
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track the health effects of the 2008 crisis found that foreclosures might have
even greater negative health effects than unemployment.46 Although these
studies analyze the general phenomenon of foreclosures and do not specifically
address how relitigation of foreclosures might impact homeowners or their
neighbors, they make clear that prolonged foreclosures can have dire economic
and social effects.
Second, the threat of a "free house" also provides leverage for homeowners
to negotiate a voluntary settlement, whether through a modification or a
"graceful exit" like a short sale.' In a world where mortgagees truly risk
forfeiting their claim by bringing illegitimate or rushed suits, homeowners will
have more time up front to regain their financial footing and negotiate a
modification or repayment plan. Enforcing finality rules may dissuade
mortgagees "from filing until they have their paperwork ready" and encourage
potential plaintiffs "to look favorably on loan renegotiation."48 Servicers of
suggest that real estate-owned foreclosed properties may put nearby neighbors at risk for
increased systolic blood pressure."); Mariana Arcaya et al., Effects of Proximate Foreclosed
Properties on Individuals' Weight Gain in Massachusetts, 1987-2008, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 50,
55 (2013) ("Exposure to proximate foreclosure activity significantly predicted higher
subsequently measured BMI . . . ."); Kathleen A. Cagney et al., The Onset of Depression
During the Great Recession: Foreclosure and Older Adult Mental Health, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
498, 504 (2014) ("Our results suggest that some portion of depression onset in older adults
is yet another consequence of the Great Recession."); Janet Currie & Erdal Tekin, Is There a
Link Between Foreclosure and Health?, 7 AM. ECON. J. 63, 87 (2015) ("[T]he estimates imply
that 2.82 million foreclosures in 2009 resulted in an additional 2.21 million nonelective
[hospital] visits."); Jason N. Houle, Mental Health in the Foreclosure Crisis, 118 Soc. Sci. &
MED. 1 (2014) (examining the association between foreclosures and mental health); Jason
N. Houle & Michael T. Light, The Home Foreclosure Crisis and Rising Suicide Rates, 2005 to
2010, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1073, 1077 (2014) ("Our results suggest that the foreclosure
crisis significantly contributed to the increase in suicides in the Great Recession."); K.A.
McLaughlin et al., Home Foreclosure and Risk of Psychiatric Morbidity During the Recent
Financial Crisis, 42 PSYCHOL. MED. 1441, 1447 (2012) ("These results ... suggest that the
foreclosure crisis could have adverse effects on the mental health of the US population.");
Theresa L. Osypuk et al., The Consequences of Foreclosure for Depressive Symptomatology, 22
ANNAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 379, 385 (2012) ("We found that recent experience of foreclosure was
associated with greater risk of severe depressive symptomatology.").
46. See Currie & Tekin, supra note 45, at 64 (finding "strong evidence" that increases in
foreclosures are associated with increased hospital visits, noting that hospital visits increased
from 2005 to 2007, a period during which foreclosure rates but not unemployment rates
were increasing).
47. See Levitin, supra note 9, at 651 ("[E]nforcement of bargained-for procedural requirements
such as standing gives homeowners leverage to achieve negotiated solutions to loan defaults,
such as a loan modification ... [or] can buy the homeowner time to relocate, enabling a
softer landing with fewer social dislocations and externalities.").
48. Victoria V. Corder, Homeowners and Bondholders as Unlikely Allies: Allocating the Costs of
Securitization in Foreclosure, 3o No. 5 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 19, 24 (2011).
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securitized loans typically believe mortgage foreclosures are faster and cheaper
than loan renegotiation,49 yet securitized-loan investors suffer greater financial
losses in foreclosures than in renegotiation and repayment.so Courts' adhesion
to traditional res judicata principles in the foreclosure process has the added
benefit of making negotiated settlements with borrowers more appealing to
banks. By realigning incentives through the increased risk of failure, courts can
induce banks to act in their own long-term interest.
Finally, although judges have expressed concern about homeowner
windfalls,s' the alternative creates a windfall for banks that cut corners in
managing and prosecuting foreclosures. The risk and costs of losing
foreclosures should already be internalized in the price of current mortgages.
Empirical studies suggest that greater protection for mortgagors historically
corresponds to slightly higher mortgage rates among lenders.s2 These studies
indicate that lenders adjust the price of mortgages based on what they
anticipate the cost, and not just the likelihood, of foreclosures will be. In
addition, lenders are more likely to extend subprime mortgages where there are
fewer legal hurdles to foreclosure.5 3 Because the requirements to bring a
successful foreclosure suit and the legal rules concerning acceleration were well
49. See Sumit Agarwal et al., The Role of Securitization in Mortgage Renegotiation, 102 J. FIN.
EcoN. 559, 559 (2011) ("[B]ank-held loans are 26-36% more likely to be renegotiated than
comparable securitized mortgages . . . [and] bank-held loans have 9% lower post-
modification default rates . . . ."); Thomasz Piskorski et al., Securitization and Distressed Loan
Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 369, 369 (2010)
("[T]he foreclosure rate of delinquent bank-held loans is 3% to 7% lower in absolute terms
(13% to 32% in relative terms) [than that of securitized loans].").
50. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Luigi Zingales, A Loan Modification Approach to the Housing Crisis,
17 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 3-4 (2009).
51. See supra note i and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Jones, Deficiency Judgments and the Exercise of the Default Option in
Home Mortgage Loans, 36 J.L. & ECON. 115, 126-27 (1993) (noting the lender response to
default rates); Mark Meador, The Effects of Mortgage Laws on Home Mortgage Rates, 34 J.
ECON. & BuS. 143, 146 (1982) (estimating a 13.87 basis-point increase in interest rates on
new homes as a result of antideficiency laws); Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity:
State Laws and Mortgage Credit, 88 REv. ECON. & STAT. 177, 180-82 (2006) (noting that
the availability-and hence, the cost-of mortgages in states with judicial-foreclosure
proceedings is greater than in states with nonjudicial foreclosures, but without inferring
causality); Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L.
REV. 489, 491 (1991) (arguing that "the relatively modest costs associated with state
mortgagor protection laws do suggest that mortgagor protections may indeed promote
economic efficiency").
53. Quinn Curtis, State Foreclosure Laws and Mortgage Origination in the Subprime, 49 J. REAL
EST. FIN. & ECON. 303, 321 (2013) ("The provisions that make foreclosure easier-non-
judicial process and readily available deficiency judgments -lead to increased applications
and accepted applications in the subprime market. . . .").
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established at the time banks priced the mortgages currently in foreclosure, the
mortgage agreements already had a chance to incorporate both the costs of
pursuing foreclosure under irrevocable acceleration laws and the risks of
homeowners prevailing-even though they often failed to do so.
Although a full discussion of the relationship between foreclosure
procedure and mortgage costs is beyond the scope of this Comment, we reject
the suggestion that lower mortgage costs and looser markets are ultimately
beneficial, for at least two reasons. First, as described above, a growing body
of empirical evidence suggests that the public-health and social costs of
foreclosure are as widespread as the benefits of lower mortgage prices,
suggesting that broader social allocation of the risk of foreclosure is
appropriate. Second, the 2008 crisis that gave rise to the very problem this
Comment addresses was caused in significant part by the loosening of
underwriting standards and an increase in subprime lending.s" In light of a
crisis precipitated by precisely these lending practices, and given the link
between the ease of foreclosures and lenders' proclivity for subprime loans,
there is good reason to increase the price of socially harmful lending practices.
Therefore, a liberalization of rules governing foreclosure after the relevant
loans have been issued would result in a broad windfall for lenders. When
courts bypass res judicata and allow mortgagees a second shot at foreclosure,
they are facilitating a shift of the risk associated with foreclosures -a risk that
banks had, or should have, already priced into the cost of the mortgages
themselves - onto homeowners.
Res judicata is generally justified as promoting respect for law because
it tends to reduce social conflict and uncertainty.ss These broader policy
arguments for imposing claim preclusion are particularly strong in the
foreclosure context, where banks have demonstrated a lack of respect for law
through their reliance on "robo-signing" and where the economic, social, and
public-health costs of legal uncertainty not only are especially dire for litigants
but also extend well beyond the parties themselves.
54. See generally JENNIFER TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE'S HOUSES: How DECADES OF BAILOUTS, CAPTIVE
REGULATORS, AND Toxic BANKERS MADE HOME MORTGAGES A THRILLING BUSINESS 123-39
(2014) (describing the practices of subprime lender Washington Mutual).
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. i, at ii (AM. LAW. INST. 1982) ("Indefinite
continuation of a dispute is a social burden. It consumes time and energy that may be put to
other use, not only of the parties but of the community as a whole. It rewards the
disputatious. It renders uncertain the working premises upon which the transactions of the
day are to be conducted. The law of res judicata reduces these burdens even if it does not
eliminate them, and is thus the quintessence of the law itself: A convention designed to
compensate for man's incomplete knowledge and strong tendency to quarrel.").
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CONCLUSION
Mortgagees, their servicers, and their attorneys currently face a crisis of
their own making. They failed to allocate the necessary resources to maintain
accurate records of homeowners' indebtedness while pursuing the profits of
securitization. Then they brought foreclosures in unprecedented numbers -on
compressed timeframes and on the cheap-in an attempt to recover quickly
their unanticipated losses. At trial, they received forgiveness for their mistakes
and abuses, obtaining a highly unusual legal outcome: judgment or dismissal
of a case, fully heard on its merits, without prejudice.
In asking courts to allow subsequent foreclosure attempts, banks ask states
and homeowners to bear the psychological and economic costs of lenders' self-
interested behavior. But if state courts refused to create an exception to the rule
of res judicata-that is, dismissed these cases with prejudice and enforced res
judicata- they would do more than enforce the rule of law. They would also
create a counterweight to current perverse incentives, encourage alternative
dispute resolution where possible, reduce negative public-health consequences
from prolonged foreclosure litigation, and ultimately promote greater social
outcomes in future foreclosure suits.
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